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The Challenger lAunch Decision: Risky Technology, Cui/un ond Deviance 01 
NASA. by Diane Vaughan. Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1996, 575 
pages. Cloth, $24.95. 
The Challenger tragedy represents an important case for understanding the 
social bases of technical failuTe. The technical reasons for the explosion are now 
well known: the failure under cold-weather conditions of a pair of o-rings. used 
as seals in the solid rocket booster (SRB). The tragedy had a sociological as well 
as a technical cause, however. NASA and the SRB contractor, Morton Thiokol. 
had advance warning of the possibility of o-ring malfunction in cold weather. Yel 
the decision was made to launch; understanding the tragedy thus requires under­
standing this decision. 
Diane Vaughan has written an exhaustive. thearelieally sophisticated, and 
mosdy persuasive account of the Challenger launch decision which questions the 
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conclusion reached by earlier investigations. The view that the tragedy reflected 
"amoral calculation" by mid-level managers who suppressed safety concerns 
makes little sense, she argues, in view of NASA's nannal concern for safety and 
the disastrous consequences of ignoring risk, Understanding the launch decision 
requires moving beyond individual actors to explore the organizational and en­
vironmental context in which it was made. Invoking anthropological ideas about 
"thick description," she plunges the reader into the culture of NASA and engi­
neering and the history of the ill-fated a-rings. 
According to Vaughan, the Challenger launch decision was made by moral 
individuals who responded to production pressures but consistently abided by the 
set of rules governing the definition of safety and risk. Engineers and managers 
were aware of problems with the o-rings, but they evaluated the evidence of 
o-ring damage using consensual procedures consistent with engineering and in­
dustry principles. Incrementally, they came to the conclusion that the o-rings were 
"safe" because they were redundant (a second o-ring would back up the first). 
There was some risk, as evidenced by damage to primary and even secondary 
o-rings, but it was within acceptable limits. 
The work group's belief in the acceptability of this risk was supported by 
larger organizational and environmental contingencies. Engineering culture ac­
commodated technical compromise, and the original "technical" culture of 
NASA had been modified to include bureaucratic and political concerns, requiring 
the balancing of all three. Vaughan also shows how "structural secrecy" made it 
difficult for NASA administrators to "know" that there was a safety problem. 
Organizational inertia made it difficult to overturn previous conclusions about 
safety; specialization limited understanding, as did technical jargon and the over­
abundance of information; regulatory mechanisms were ineffective. 
On the eve of the launch, decision makers at NASA were concerned enough 
about the effects of cold temperatures to ask for a teleconference with Thiokol. 
Thiokol engineers recommended against launch, arguing [hat risk increased un­
acceptably in cold temperatures. However. they did not have unambiguous hard 
data to back up their recommendation. This prevented an effective formal chal­
lenge to the belief in o-ring safety; various obstacles to communication limited 
the effectiveness of the warnings the engineers were able to send out. 
On the whole, Vaughan mounts an effective critique of the amoral calculation 
hypothesis. She provides abundant evidence indicating thai procedures were fol­
lowed and that there was a pervasive belief in the safety of the o-rings; similarly, 
she shows that the view that rules were violated is based on a misunderstanding 
of NASA's procedures. Nevertheless, Vaughan may read more into this than is 
warranted. She admits in her conclusion that the normalization of deviance may, 
in other contexts, facilitate misconduct, so why not in the Challenger case? There 
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is no clear evidence that individuals used the rules to cover their conscious trans­
gressions. But Vaughan's argument that there was no malfeasance too often boils 
down to a simple insistence that actors followed the rules of decision making, 
which tends to assume what needs to be proven. 
This is particularly importanl as Vaughan appears to have relatively limited 
access to events at Morton Thiokal. Since engineers there eventually cautioned 
against cold-weather launch, and since Thiokol managers excluded the engineers 
from the launch decision, it is conceivable that concern about the o-rings prior to 
the Challenger incident was greater than it appeared. Circumstantial evidence to 
this effect exists, since when NASA asked for a teleconference on the question, 
the Thiokol engineers responded with an extremely unusual no-launch recom­
mendation, even in the absence of "hard" evidence. If nothing else, Vaughan's 
account does not allow us to dismiss completely this alternative hypothesis. 
The conclusions Vaughan draws from her analysis are also persuasive and 
reasonable, but could be expanded. She makes a strong case that the focus on 
middle management malfeasance distracts from the real responsibility of orga­
nizational and political elites in shaping the decision-making environment. It also 
makes technical decisions seem deceptively routine. Most importantly, it draws 
attention away from the ways in which routine organizational practices can "nor­
malize" deviance. 
Vaughan could add that Thiokol's apparent willingness to express its con­
cerns about the o-rings only after NASA asked and NASA's aggressive reaction 
to the unusual suggestion by a contractor that launch be delayed may suggest that 
interorganizational hierarchy played a role in structuring this (and perhaps other) 
technical decisions. Finally, her analysis reveals the limits of engineering culture. 
Engineers' willingness to balance technical, economic, political, and bureaucratic 
pressures reduced the chances that concerns about o-ring safety would be voiced 
in unambiguous ways. And engineering "craft," as Vaughan calls it, which con­
structs lasting conclusions on the basis of necessarily imperfect knowledge and 
best estimates, may encourage certainty about matters which should be routinely 
questioned. 
Peter Meiksins, Cleveland State University 
